Journal article | Zeitschriftenartikel

Tax policy and yardstick voting in Flemish municipal elections

Recent theoretical papers develop political agency models in which voters compare tax policy with that in neighbouring jurisdictions. In these yardstick competition models voters judge incumbents by comparing their policy with policy in neighbouring jurisdictions. We analyse municipal elections in Flanders during the period 1982-2000 and find empirical evidence for yardstick voting. Incumbents are punished for higher tax rates. Importantly, the electoral punishment also depends on tax rates in neighbouring municipalities. Higher rates in neighbouring municipalities are favourable for the incumbents.

Tax policy and yardstick voting  
in Flemish municipal elections

Tax policy and yardstick voting in Flemish municipal elections | Urheber*in: Vermeir, Jan; Heyndels, Bruno

Rechte vorbehalten - Freier Zugang

0
/
0

Umfang
Seite(n): 2285-2298
Sprache
Englisch
Anmerkungen
Status: Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)

Erschienen in
Applied Economics, 38(19)

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Vermeir, Jan
Heyndels, Bruno
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wann)
2006

DOI
URN
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-239238
Rechteinformation
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
Letzte Aktualisierung
21.06.2024, 16:27 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Zeitschriftenartikel

Beteiligte

  • Vermeir, Jan
  • Heyndels, Bruno

Entstanden

  • 2006

Ähnliche Objekte (12)