Shared intentions: Collaboration evolving

Arbeitspapier

A recent series of papers has introduced a fresh perspective on the problem of the evolution of human cooperation by suggesting an amendment to the concept of cooperation itself: instead of thinking of cooperation as playing a particular strategy in a given game, usually C in the prisoner's dilemma, we could also think of cooperation as collaboration, i.e. as coalitional strategy choice, such as jointly switching from (D;D) to (C;C). The present paper complements previous work on collaboration by expanding on its genericity: conditions for the evolutionary viability and stability of collaboration under fairly undemanding assumptions about population and interaction structure are derived. Doing so, this paper shows that collaboration is an adaptive principle of strategy choice in a broad range of niches, i.e., stochastic mixtures of games.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 39-2017

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Rusch, Hannes
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics
• (wo): Marburg
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/174335
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ