Arbeitspapier

Intentions Undercover - Hiding Intentions is Considered Unfair

Unfair intentions provoke negative reciprocity from others, making their concealment potentially beneficial. This paper explores whether people hide their unfair intentions from others and how hiding intentions is itself perceived in fairness terms. Our experimental data show a high frequency of cover-up attempts and that affected parties punish the concealment of intentions, establishing that people consider not only unkind intentions but also hiding intentions unfair. When choosing whether or not to hide intentions, subjects trade-off the lower expected punishment when the cover up of unfair intentions is successful against the higher expected punishment when cover up is unsuccessful. In an attempt to better understand fairness perceptions, we present a typology of punisher types and show that hiding unkind intentions is treated differently than unkind intentions, possibly establishing a behavioral category of its own.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5218

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: General
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Thema
intentions
reciprocity
fairness
avoidance
cover up
experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Friehe, Tim
Utikal, Verena
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Friehe, Tim
  • Utikal, Verena
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2015

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