On the (Im)possibility of Preventing Differential Computation Analysis with Internal Encodings
Abstract: White-box cryptography aims at protecting implementations of cryptographic algorithms against a very powerful attacker who controls the execution environment. The first defensive brick traditionally embedded in such implementations consists of encodings, which are bijections supposed to conceal sensitive data manipulated by the white-box. Several previous works have sought to evaluate the relevance of encodings to protect white-box implementations against grey-box attacks such as Differential Computation Analysis (DCA). However, these works have been either probabilistic or partial in nature. In particular, while they showed that DCA succeeds with high probability against AES white-box implementations protected by random encodings, they did not refute the existence of a particular class of encodings that could prevent the attack. One could thus wonder if carefully crafting specific encodings instead of drawing random bijections could be a solution. This article bridges the gap betw.... https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/11684
- Location
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
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Online-Ressource
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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On the (Im)possibility of Preventing Differential Computation Analysis with Internal Encodings ; volume:2024 ; number:3 ; year:2024
IACR transactions on cryptographic hardware and embedded systems ; 2024, Heft 3 (2024)
- Creator
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Castelnovi, Laurent
Houzelot, Agathe
- DOI
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10.46586/tches.v2024.i3.452-471
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:101:1-2407241855068.764319861993
- Rights
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Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
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14.08.2025, 11:01 AM CEST
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Castelnovi, Laurent
- Houzelot, Agathe