On the (Im)possibility of Preventing Differential Computation Analysis with Internal Encodings

Abstract: White-box cryptography aims at protecting implementations of cryptographic algorithms against a very powerful attacker who controls the execution environment. The first defensive brick traditionally embedded in such implementations consists of encodings, which are bijections supposed to conceal sensitive data manipulated by the white-box. Several previous works have sought to evaluate the relevance of encodings to protect white-box implementations against grey-box attacks such as Differential Computation Analysis (DCA). However, these works have been either probabilistic or partial in nature. In particular, while they showed that DCA succeeds with high probability against AES white-box implementations protected by random encodings, they did not refute the existence of a particular class of encodings that could prevent the attack. One could thus wonder if carefully crafting specific encodings instead of drawing random bijections could be a solution. This article bridges the gap betw.... https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/11684

Standort
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Umfang
Online-Ressource
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
On the (Im)possibility of Preventing Differential Computation Analysis with Internal Encodings ; volume:2024 ; number:3 ; year:2024
IACR transactions on cryptographic hardware and embedded systems ; 2024, Heft 3 (2024)

Urheber
Castelnovi, Laurent
Houzelot, Agathe

DOI
10.46586/tches.v2024.i3.452-471
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2407241855068.764319861993
Rechteinformation
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Letzte Aktualisierung
14.08.2025, 11:01 MESZ

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Beteiligte

  • Castelnovi, Laurent
  • Houzelot, Agathe

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