Asset Ownership and Contractability of Interaction

Arbeitspapier

In a property-rights framework, I study how organizational form and quantity contracts interact in generating investment incentives. The model nests standard property-rights and hold-up models as special cases. I admit general message-dependent contracts, but provide conditions under which non-contingent contracts are optimal. First, I contribute to the foundation of the property-rights theory: I characterize under which circumstances its predictions are correct when trade is contractible. Second, I study how the optimal use of the incentive instruments depends on the environment. This is in the spirit of the multitasking literature. Finally, the model produces implications of the property-rights theory that are empirically testable.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 12/2002

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Firm Organization and Market Structure ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Thema: Property Rights ; Incomplete Contracts ; Specific Investments ; Eigentumsrechtstheorie ; Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung ; Vertragstheorie ; Investition ; Sunk Costs ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Roider, Andreas
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2002

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22823
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ