Arbeitspapier
Ruling elites´ rotation and asset ownership: Implications for property rights
We provide a theory and empirical evidence indicating that the rotation of ruling elites in conjunction with elites´ asset ownership could improve property rights protection in non-democracies. The mechanism that upholds property rights is based on elites´ concern about the security of their own asset ownership in the event they lose power. Such incentives provide a solution to the credible commitment problem in maintaining secure property rights when institutional restrictions on expropriation are weak or absent.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IOS Working Papers ; No. 343
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Property Law
Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Capitalist Systems: Property Rights
- Thema
-
endogenous property rights
credible commitment
“stationary bandit”
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Polishchuk, Leonid
Syunyaevy, Georgiy
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung (IOS)
- (wo)
-
Regensburg
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2014101419574
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Polishchuk, Leonid
- Syunyaevy, Georgiy
- Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung (IOS)
Entstanden
- 2014