Immediate Agreement in Interdependent Bilateral Bargaining

Arbeitspapier

This note provides sufficient conditions for immediate agreement in an extensive form model of interdependent bilateral bargaining. The model is suggested by Björnerstedt and Stennek (2006) as a work horse for studying bilateral oligopoly. The key feature of this model is that the firms are represented by separate agents in all negotiations in which they are involved. There is immediate agreement in equilibrium, essentially if production is strictly convex or if the agents use Markov strategies.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 692

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Production and Organizations: General ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General ; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General ; Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
• Subject: Bilateral Oligopoly ; Intermediate Goods ; Bargaining ; Market Network ; Trade Link ; Spieltheorie ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Oligopol ; Vorprodukt ; Unternehmensnetzwerk

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Björnerstedt, Jonas ; Stennek, Johan
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
• (where): Stockholm
• (when): 2007

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81288
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET