Arbeitspapier

Cartel detection in procurement markets

Cartel detection is usually viewed as a key task of either competition authorities or compliance officials in firms with an elevated risk of cartelization. We argue that customers of hard core cartels can have both incentives and possibilities to detect such agreements on their own initiative through the use of market-specific data sets. We apply a unique data set of about 340,000 market transactions from 36 smaller and larger customers of German cement producers and show that a price screen would have allowed particularly larger customers to detect the upstream cement cartel before the competition authority. The results not only suggest that monitoring procurement markets through screening tools has the potential of substantial cost reductions - thereby improving the competitive position of the respective user firms - but also allow the conclusion that competition authorities should view customers of potentially cartelized industries as important allies in their endeavour to fight hard core cartels.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 11-066

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Metals and Metal Products; Cement; Glass; Ceramics
Production Management
Business Economics
Antitrust Law
Thema
business economics
procurement
antitrust policy
cartels
detection
screening
Beschaffung
Kartell
Zementindustrie
Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung
Kontrolle
Deutschland

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hüschelrath, Kai
Veith, Tobias
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
(wo)
Mannheim
(wann)
2011

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hüschelrath, Kai
  • Veith, Tobias
  • Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)

Entstanden

  • 2011

Ähnliche Objekte (12)