Arbeitspapier

Punitive Sanctions and the Transition Rate from Welfare to Work

In the Netherlands, the average exit rate out of welfare is dramatically low. Most welfare recipients have to comply with guidelines on job search effort that are imposed by the welfare agency. If they do not, then a sanction in the form of a temporary benefit reduction can be imposed. This article investigates the effect of such sanctions on the transition rate from welfare to work using a unique set of rich register data on welfare recipients. We find that the imposition of sanctions substantially increases the individual transition rate from welfare to work.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 98-076/3

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Öffentliche Sozialleistungen
Arbeitsangebot
Niederlande

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
van den Berg, Gerard J.
van der Klaauw, Bas
van Ours, Jan C.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Tinbergen Institute
(where)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(when)
1998

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • van den Berg, Gerard J.
  • van der Klaauw, Bas
  • van Ours, Jan C.
  • Tinbergen Institute

Time of origin

  • 1998

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