Arbeitspapier

Carrot and Stick: How Reemployment Bonuses and Benefit Sanctions affect Job Finding Rates

To increase their transition from welfare to work, benefit recipients in the municipality of Rotterdam were exposed to various financial incentives, including both carrots to sticks. Once their benefit spell exceeded one year, welfare recipients were entitled to a reemployment bonus if they found a job that lasted at least six months. However, they could also be punished for noncompliance with eligibility requirements and face a sanction, i.e. a temporary reducing of their benefits. In this paper we investigate how benefit sanctions and reemployment bonuses affect job finding rates of welfare recipients. We find that benefit sanctions were effective in bringing unemployed from welfare to work more quickly while reemployment bonuses were not.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 10-064/3

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions
Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies
Thema
welfare to work
financial incentives
timing-of-events
dynamic selection
Aktivierende Arbeitsmarktpolitik
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Arbeitsmarktintegration
Arbeitsmarktpolitik
Beschäftigungseffekt
Rotterdam

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
van der Klaauw, Bas
van Ours, Jan C.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • van der Klaauw, Bas
  • van Ours, Jan C.
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2010

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