Arbeitspapier

Why is there a spike in the job finding rate at benefit exhaustion?

Putting a limit on the duration of unemployment benefits tends to introduce a spike in the job finding rate shortly before benefits are exhausted. Current theories explain this spike from workers' behavior. We present a theoretical model in which also the nature of the job matters. End-of-benefit spikes in job finding rates are related to optimizing behavior of unemployed workers who rationally assume that employers will accept delays in the starting date of a new job, especially if these jobs are permanent. We use a dataset on Slovenian unemployment spells to test this prediction and find supporting evidence. We conclude that the spike in the job finding rate suggests that workers exploit unemployment insurance benefits for subsidized leisure.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 4523

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
General Welfare; Well-Being
Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
Thema
Unemployment benefits
spikes
Arbeitsuche
Arbeitslosenversicherung
Dauer
Arbeitsangebot
Freizeit
Slowenien

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Boone, Jan
van Ours, Jan C.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2009

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-20091105941
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Boone, Jan
  • van Ours, Jan C.
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2009

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