Pincering SKINNY by Exploiting Slow Diffusion : Enhancing Differential Power Analysis with Cluster Graph Inference

Abstract: Lightweight cryptography is an emerging field where designers are testing the limits of symmetric cryptography. We investigate the resistance against sidechannel attacks of a new class of lighter blockciphers, which use a classic substitution–permutation network with slow diffusion and many rounds. Among these ciphers, we focus on SKINNY, a primitive used up to the final round ofNIST’s recent lightweight standardisation effort. We show that the lack of diffusion in the key scheduler allows an attacker to combine leakage from the first and the last rounds, effectively pincering its target. Furthermore, the slow diffusion used by its partial key-absorption and linear layers enable, on both sides, to target S-Boxes from several rounds deep. As some of these S-boxes leak on the same part of the key, full key recovery exploiting all leakage requires a clever combining strategy. We introduce the use of cluster graph inference (an established tool from probabilistic graphical model theory.... https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/11173

Location
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Extent
Online-Ressource
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Pincering SKINNY by Exploiting Slow Diffusion ; volume:2023 ; number:4 ; year:2023
IACR transactions on cryptographic hardware and embedded systems ; 2023, Heft 4 (2023)

Creator
Costes, Nicolas
Stam, Martijn

DOI
10.46586/tches.v2023.i4.460-492
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2023102518564093059792
Rights
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Last update
14.08.2025, 10:50 AM CEST

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Associated

  • Costes, Nicolas
  • Stam, Martijn

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