Arbeitspapier

Monetary commitment and the level of public debt

We analyze the interaction between committed monetary policy and discretionary fiscal policy in a model with public debt, endogenous government expenditures, distortive taxation and nominal rigidities. Fiscal decisions lack commitment but are Markovperfect. Monetary commitment to an interest rate path leads to a unique level of debt. This level of debt is positive if the central bank adopts closed-loop strategies that raise the real interest rate when inflation is above target owing to fiscal deviations. More aggressive defence of the inflation target implies lower debt and higher welfare. Simple Taylor-type interest rate rules achieve welfare levels similar to those generated by sophisticated closed-loop strategies.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper ; No. 2016-3

Classification
Wirtschaft
Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
Business Fluctuations; Cycles
Monetary Policy
Subject
Credibility
Fiscal policy
Inflation targets
Monetary policy framework

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Gnocchi, Stefano
Lambertini, Luisa
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bank of Canada
(where)
Ottawa
(when)
2016

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2016-3
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Gnocchi, Stefano
  • Lambertini, Luisa
  • Bank of Canada

Time of origin

  • 2016

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