Arbeitspapier

Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? An experiment

We implement the Rawlsian veil of ignorance in the laboratory. Our experimental design allows separating the effects of risk and social preferences behind the veil of ignorance. Subjects prefer more equal distributions behind than in front of the veil of ignorance, but only a minority acts according to maximin preferences. Men prefer more equal allocations mostly for insurance purposes, women also due to social preferences for equality. Our results contrast the Utilitarian's claim that behind the veil of ignorance maximin preferences necessarily imply infinite risk aversion. They are compatible with any degree of risk aversion as long as social preferences for equality are sufficiently strong.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 230

Classification
Wirtschaft
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Design of Experiments: Other
Subject
law and economics
incentives
crowding out
experiment

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Hörisch, Hannah
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(where)
München
(when)
2008

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13322
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13322-8
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Hörisch, Hannah
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Time of origin

  • 2008

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