Arbeitspapier
Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? An experiment
We implement the Rawlsian veil of ignorance in the laboratory. Our experimental design allows separating the effects of risk and social preferences behind the veil of ignorance. Subjects prefer more equal distributions behind than in front of the veil of ignorance, but only a minority acts according to maximin preferences. Men prefer more equal allocations mostly for insurance purposes, women also due to social preferences for equality. Our results contrast the Utilitarian's claim that behind the veil of ignorance maximin preferences necessarily imply infinite risk aversion. They are compatible with any degree of risk aversion as long as social preferences for equality are sufficiently strong.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 230
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Design of Experiments: Other
- Subject
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law and economics
incentives
crowding out
experiment
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Hörisch, Hannah
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (where)
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München
- (when)
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2008
- DOI
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doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13322
- Handle
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13322-8
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Hörisch, Hannah
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Time of origin
- 2008