Arbeitspapier
The Trust Game behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Note on Gender Differences
We analyze gender differences in the trust game in a behind the veil of ignorance design. This method yields strategies that are consistent with actions observed in the classical trust game experiments. We observe that, on average, men and women do not differ in trust, and that women are slightly more trustworthy. However, men's strategies are bimodal, peaking at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and the Pareto efficient frontier, while women's strategies are single peaked at moderate transfers. For a given high level of pro-social preferences, men send more than women. This may be linked to men willing to bear more risk than women.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 10-063/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
- Thema
-
trust game
experiment
strategy method behind the veil of ignorance
gender differences
Ultimatumspiel
Geschlecht
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Vyrastekova, Jana
Onderstal, Sander
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Vyrastekova, Jana
- Onderstal, Sander
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2010