Arbeitspapier

The Trust Game behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Note on Gender Differences

We analyze gender differences in the trust game in a behind the veil of ignorance design. This method yields strategies that are consistent with actions observed in the classical trust game experiments. We observe that, on average, men and women do not differ in trust, and that women are slightly more trustworthy. However, men's strategies are bimodal, peaking at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and the Pareto efficient frontier, while women's strategies are single peaked at moderate transfers. For a given high level of pro-social preferences, men send more than women. This may be linked to men willing to bear more risk than women.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 10-063/1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Thema
trust game
experiment
strategy method behind the veil of ignorance
gender differences
Ultimatumspiel
Geschlecht
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Vyrastekova, Jana
Onderstal, Sander
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Vyrastekova, Jana
  • Onderstal, Sander
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2010

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