Arbeitspapier
Job Security and Work Absence: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
We analyze the consequences for sickness absence of a selective softening of job security legislation for small firms in Sweden in 2001. According to our differences-in-difference estimates, aggregate absence in these firms fell by 0.2-0.3 days per year. This aggregate net figure hides important effects on different groups of employees. Workers remaining in the reform firms after the reform reduced their absence by about one day. People with a high absence record tended to leave reform firms, but these firms also became less reluctant to hire people with a record of high absence.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 660
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
National Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining: General
Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
- Thema
-
Seniority Rules
Sick Pay Insurance
Firing Costs
Moral Hazard
Kündigungsschutz
Fehlzeit
Krankheit
Moral Hazard
Wirkungsanalyse
Schweden
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lindbeck, Assar
Palme, Mårten
Persson, Mats
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
- (wo)
-
Stockholm
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lindbeck, Assar
- Palme, Mårten
- Persson, Mats
- Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
Entstanden
- 2006
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