Job security and work absence : evidence from a natural experiment

Arbeitspapier

We analyze the consequences for sickness absence of a selective softening of job security legislation for small firms in Sweden in 2001. According to our differences-in-difference estimates, aggregate absence in these firms fell by 0.2-0.3 days per year. This aggregate net figure hides important effects on different groups of employees. Workers remaining in the reform firms after the reform reduced their absence by about one day. People with a high absence record tended to leave reform firms, but these firms also became less reluctant to hire people with a record of high absence.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1687

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Time Allocation and Labor Supply ; Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs ; National Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs ; Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
• Thema: seniority rules ; sick pay insurance ; firing costs ; moral hazard ; Kündigungsschutz ; Fehlzeit ; Krankheit ; Moral Hazard ; Wirtschaftspolitische Wirkungsanalyse ; Schweden

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Lindbeck, Assar ; Palme, Mårten ; Persson, Mats
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2006

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19151
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ