Arbeitspapier

Asymmetric Races of Research and Development

In this paper we study a one-shot game of R&D between two price-setting firms that are asymmetrically placed as they produce at different cost levels. First we prove the existence and the properties of a noncooperative equilibrium. Then, we show that the higher (lower) the discount rate, the lower (higher) the probability of innovating of the current leader. In a specialised version of the model we establish the effect of the productivity of R&D espenditure, initial cost gap, and market size on the expected identity of the winner of the patent race.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 51

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Delbono, Flavio
Denicolò, Vincenzo
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(where)
Bologna
(when)
1988

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5363
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Delbono, Flavio
  • Denicolò, Vincenzo
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Time of origin

  • 1988

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