Arbeitspapier
Asymmetric Races of Research and Development
In this paper we study a one-shot game of R&D between two price-setting firms that are asymmetrically placed as they produce at different cost levels. First we prove the existence and the properties of a noncooperative equilibrium. Then, we show that the higher (lower) the discount rate, the lower (higher) the probability of innovating of the current leader. In a specialised version of the model we establish the effect of the productivity of R&D espenditure, initial cost gap, and market size on the expected identity of the winner of the patent race.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 51
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Delbono, Flavio
Denicolò, Vincenzo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (wo)
-
Bologna
- (wann)
-
1988
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5363
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Delbono, Flavio
- Denicolò, Vincenzo
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Entstanden
- 1988