College Choice and the Selection of Mechanisms: A Structural Empirical Analysis

Arbeitspapier

We use rich microeconomic data on performance and choices of students at college entry to study the interaction between the revelation of college preferences through exams and the selection of allocation mechanisms. We propose a method in which preferences and expectations of students are identified from data on choices and multiple exam grades. Counterfactuals we consider balance costs arising from congestion and exam organization. Moving to deferred acceptance or inverting the timing of choices and exams are shown to increase welfare. Redistribution among students or schools is sizeable in all counterfactual experiments.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IWH Discussion Papers ; No. 3/2016

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Econometrics of Games and Auctions ; Market Design ; Analysis of Education
• Thema: education ; two-sided matching ; school allocation mechanism ; policy evaluation

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Carvalho, José-Raimundo ; Magnac, Thierry ; Xiong, Qizhou
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)
• (wo): Halle (Saale)
• (wann): 2016

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/129274
• URN: urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-53145
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ