Artikel

College choice, selection, and allocation mechanisms: A structural empirical analysis

We use rich microeconomic data on performance and choices of students at college entry to analyze interactions between the selection mechanism, eliciting college preferences through exams, and the allocation mechanism. We set up a framework in which success probabilities and student preferences are shown to be identified from data on their choices and their exam grades under exclusion restrictions and support conditions. The counterfactuals we consider balance the severity of congestion and the quality of the match between schools and students. Moving to deferred acceptance or inverting the timing of choices and exams are shown to increase welfare. Redistribution among students and among schools is also sizeable in all counterfactual experiments.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Quantitative Economics ; ISSN: 1759-7331 ; Volume: 10 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1233-1277 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification
Wirtschaft
Econometrics of Games and Auctions
Market Design
Analysis of Education
Subject
Education
two-sided matching
school allocation mechanism
policy evaluation

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Carvalho Júnior, José Raimundo de Araújo
Magnac, Thierry
Xiong, Qizhou
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Econometric Society
(where)
New Haven, CT
(when)
2019

DOI
doi:10.3982/QE951
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Carvalho Júnior, José Raimundo de Araújo
  • Magnac, Thierry
  • Xiong, Qizhou
  • The Econometric Society

Time of origin

  • 2019

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