Artikel
College choice, selection, and allocation mechanisms: A structural empirical analysis
We use rich microeconomic data on performance and choices of students at college entry to analyze interactions between the selection mechanism, eliciting college preferences through exams, and the allocation mechanism. We set up a framework in which success probabilities and student preferences are shown to be identified from data on their choices and their exam grades under exclusion restrictions and support conditions. The counterfactuals we consider balance the severity of congestion and the quality of the match between schools and students. Moving to deferred acceptance or inverting the timing of choices and exams are shown to increase welfare. Redistribution among students and among schools is also sizeable in all counterfactual experiments.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Quantitative Economics ; ISSN: 1759-7331 ; Volume: 10 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1233-1277 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Econometrics of Games and Auctions
Market Design
Analysis of Education
- Subject
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Education
two-sided matching
school allocation mechanism
policy evaluation
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Carvalho Júnior, José Raimundo de Araújo
Magnac, Thierry
Xiong, Qizhou
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Econometric Society
- (where)
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New Haven, CT
- (when)
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2019
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/QE951
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Carvalho Júnior, José Raimundo de Araújo
- Magnac, Thierry
- Xiong, Qizhou
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2019