Artikel

Social preferences, monopsony and government intervention

Monopsony power by firms and social preferences by consumers are well established. We analyze how wages and employment change in a monopsony if workers compare their income with that of a reference group. We show that the undistorted, competitive outcome may no longer constitute the benchmark for welfare comparisons and derive a condition that guarantees that the monopsony distortion is exactly balanced by the impact of social comparisons. We also demonstrate how wage restrictions and subsidies or taxes can be used to ensure this condition, both for a welfarist and a paternalistic welfare objective.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique ; ISSN: 1540-5982 ; Volume: 54 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 864-891

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Goerke, Laszlo
Neugart, Michael
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wiley
(where)
Hoboken, NJ
(when)
2021

DOI
doi:10.1111/caje.12515
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Goerke, Laszlo
  • Neugart, Michael
  • Wiley

Time of origin

  • 2021

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