Artikel

Trade unions and corporate social responsibility

Trade unions distort a profit-maximizing firm's input choice. The nature of the resulting inefficiency depends on whether there are wage negotiations or there is efficient bargaining. Moreover, trade unions redistribute income and thereby affect welfare. If firms also pursue Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) objectives, input choices may be distorted already in the absence of collective bargaining. Adopting a positive perspective, we show that CSR objectives, which induce a firm to expand production, have ambiguous wage and employment consequences in case of wage negotiations and raise employment if there is efficient bargaining. Importantly from a normative vantage point, such CSR objectives make a welfare-enhancing role of trade unions more likely in the presence of wage negotiations. The reverse is true in case of efficient bargaining.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics ; ISSN: 1467-8292 ; Volume: 93 ; Year: 2022 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 177-203 ; Hoboken, NJ: Wiley

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
corporate social responsibility
efficient bargaining
trade unions
wage bargaining
welfare

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Goerke, Laszlo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Wiley
(wo)
Hoboken, NJ
(wann)
2022

DOI
doi:10.1111/apce.12313
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Goerke, Laszlo
  • Wiley

Entstanden

  • 2022

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