The citizen-candidate model with imperfect policy control

Arbeitspapier

We examine the two-candidate equilibria of the citizen-candidate model when the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: the distance between the candidates' policies, both ideal and implemented, remains strictly above a threshold. Thus, the median voters' ideal policy may not obtain in contested elections if policy control is imperfect, even when the cost of running as a candidate is arbitrarily small.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3900

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
• Thema: elections ; polarization ; strategic delegation ; bureaucracy ; foreign influence ; Wahl ; Median Voter ; Bürokratie ; Kooperative Führung ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Aytimur, R. Emre ; Boukouras, Aristotelis ; Schwager, Robert
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2012

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/61010
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ