The citizen-candidate model with imperfect policy control

Arbeitspapier

We examine the two-candidate equilibria of the citizen-candidate model when the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: the distance between the candidates' policies, both ideal and implemented, remains strictly above a threshold. Thus, the median voters' ideal policy may not obtain in contested elections if policy control is imperfect, even when the cost of running as a candidate is arbitrarily small.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3900

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
• Subject: elections ; polarization ; strategic delegation ; bureaucracy ; foreign influence ; Wahl ; Median Voter ; Bürokratie ; Kooperative Führung ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Aytimur, R. Emre ; Boukouras, Aristotelis ; Schwager, Robert
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/61010