Arbeitspapier
The citizen-candidate model with imperfect policy control
We examine the two-candidate equilibria of the citizen-candidate model when the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: the distance between the candidates' policies, both ideal and implemented, remains strictly above a threshold. Thus, the median voters' ideal policy may not obtain in contested elections if policy control is imperfect, even when the cost of running as a candidate is arbitrarily small.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3900
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
- Thema
-
elections
polarization
strategic delegation
bureaucracy
foreign influence
Wahl
Median Voter
Bürokratie
Kooperative Führung
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Aytimur, R. Emre
Boukouras, Aristotelis
Schwager, Robert
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Aytimur, R. Emre
- Boukouras, Aristotelis
- Schwager, Robert
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2012
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