Arbeitspapier
The citizen-candidate model with imperfect policy control
We present a modified citizen-candidate model where the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the two-candidate equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: however small the cost of candidacy, the distance between the candidates´ policies, both ideal and implemented, remains strictly above a threshold. Moreover, there may be one-candidate equilibria in which the only candidate is not the one most preferred by the median voter. Both results point out that, even with negligible cost of entry, there are limits to strategic delegation.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: cege Discussion Papers ; No. 240
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- Thema
-
elections
polarization
strategic delegation
bureaucracy
foreign influence
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Aytimur, R. Emre
Boukouras, Aristotelis
Schwager, Robert
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege)
- (wo)
-
Göttingen
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Aytimur, R. Emre
- Boukouras, Aristotelis
- Schwager, Robert
- University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege)
Entstanden
- 2015
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