Arbeitspapier
Informed-Principal Problem in Mechanisms with Limited Commitment
This paper studies mechanism design with limited commitment where agents have correlated persistent types over the infinite horizon. The mechanism designer now faces the informed-principal problem in addition to usual issues with i.i.d. types. The paper first shows revelation principle in this context then shows sufficient conditions for obtaining full-commitment solutions with limited commitment.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7513
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
mechanism design
limited commitment
revelation principle
informed-principal problem
persistence
correlated types
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kwon, Suehyun
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kwon, Suehyun
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2019
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