- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
In: Macroeconomic Dynamics ; 12 (2008), Supplement S1. - S. 20-30
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Konstanz
- (wer)
-
Bibliothek der Universität Konstanz
- (wann)
-
2009
- Urheber
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-88708
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
25.03.2025, 13:54 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Azariadis, Costas
- Kaas, Leo
- Bibliothek der Universität Konstanz
Entstanden
- 2009
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