Konferenzbeitrag
CONTRACT DESIGN WITH LIMITED COMMITMENT
We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit to not renegotiating any outcome of any mechanism. We provide a general characterization of renegotiation-proof outcomes. We apply the solution to a setting with a continuous type space, private values and non-linear contracts. We find that the optimal renegotiation-proof outcomes for the principal are pooling outcomes and satisfy a “no-distortion-at-the-bottom” property.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Contract Theory ; No. G09-V2
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gretschko, Vitali
Wambach, Achim
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- (wo)
-
Kiel, Hamburg
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Konferenzbeitrag
Beteiligte
- Gretschko, Vitali
- Wambach, Achim
- ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Entstanden
- 2017
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