Konferenzbeitrag
CONTRACT DESIGN WITH LIMITED COMMITMENT
We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit to not renegotiating any outcome of any mechanism. We provide a general characterization of renegotiation-proof outcomes. We apply the solution to a setting with a continuous type space, private values and non-linear contracts. We find that the optimal renegotiation-proof outcomes for the principal are pooling outcomes and satisfy a “no-distortion-at-the-bottom” property.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Contract Theory ; No. G09-V2
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Gretschko, Vitali
Wambach, Achim
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- (where)
-
Kiel, Hamburg
- (when)
-
2017
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Konferenzbeitrag
Associated
- Gretschko, Vitali
- Wambach, Achim
- ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Time of origin
- 2017
Other Objects (12)
Contract design with limited commitment
Contract design with limited commitment
Contract Design with Socially-Attentive Preferences
Contract design and insurance fraud: an experimental investigation
Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Contract Design with Endogenous Monitoring
Temptation and Commitment in the Laboratory
Globalization, Political Regimes and International Environmental Commitment
Contract Enforcement by the Gods
Taxation of Annual Income as a Commitment Device
Contract Enforcement and R&D Investment
Commitment and Borrower Heterogeneity: Evidence from Revolving Consumer Credit
Social networking sites users' affective commitment: A combined view
Contract design with limited commitment
Contract design with limited commitment
Contract Design with Socially-Attentive Preferences
Contract design and insurance fraud: an experimental investigation
Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Contract Design with Endogenous Monitoring
Temptation and Commitment in the Laboratory
Globalization, Political Regimes and International Environmental Commitment
Contract Enforcement by the Gods
Taxation of Annual Income as a Commitment Device
Contract Enforcement and R&D Investment
Commitment and Borrower Heterogeneity: Evidence from Revolving Consumer Credit
Social networking sites users' affective commitment: A combined view
Contract design with limited commitment
Contract design with limited commitment
Contract Design with Socially-Attentive Preferences
Contract design and insurance fraud: an experimental investigation
Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Contract Design with Endogenous Monitoring
Temptation and Commitment in the Laboratory
Globalization, Political Regimes and International Environmental Commitment
Contract Enforcement by the Gods
Taxation of Annual Income as a Commitment Device
Contract Enforcement and R&D Investment
Commitment and Borrower Heterogeneity: Evidence from Revolving Consumer Credit