Strategic information revelation and revenue sharing in an R&D race

Arbeitspapier

Firms learn imperfectly about their cost of investment. We study how this information affects firms’ incentives to invest in R&D by comparing investments and profits under public and private information. Revenue sharing between the winner and loser of the race, e.g. through licensing contracts, weakens the appropriability of the innovation’s revenues, and creates free- rider effects. These free-rider effects not only soften R&D competition, but also affect the firms’ incentives to acquire and reveal information. How much information firms eventually reveal, and consequently the information acquisition and innovation incentives, also depends on the verifiability of information.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. FS IV 01-06

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Organization of Production ; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives ; Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
• Subject: R&D ; Competition ; Revelation ; Information Acquisition ; Revenue Sharing

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Jansen, Jos
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2001

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51060
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET