Arbeitspapier
Arm's Length Provision of Public Services
We analyze the economic consequences of strategic delegation of the right to decide between public or private provision of governmental service and/or the authority to negotiate and renegotiate with the chosen service provider. Our model encompass both bureaucratic delegation from a government to a privatization agency and electoral delegation from voters to a government. We identify two powerfull effects of delegation when contracts are incomplete: The incentive effect increases the incentive part of service providers’ remuneration and we show that strategic delegation may substitute formal incentive contracts. The bargaining effect improves the bargaining position vis a vis a private firm with market power and leads to a lower price for the service. Outsourcing, Strategic Delegation, Incentives, Incomplete Contracting, Market Power, Representative Democracy.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working paper ; No. 7-2007
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Schultz, Christian
Bennedsen, Morten
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Frederiksberg
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Schultz, Christian
- Bennedsen, Morten
- Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2008