Arbeitspapier

Arm's Length Provision of Public Services

We analyze the economic consequences of strategic delegation of the right to decide between public or private provision of governmental service and/or the authority to negotiate and renegotiate with the chosen service provider. Our model encompass both bureaucratic delegation from a government to a privatization agency and electoral delegation from voters to a government. We identify two powerfull effects of delegation when contracts are incomplete: The incentive effect increases the incentive part of service providers’ remuneration and we show that strategic delegation may substitute formal incentive contracts. The bargaining effect improves the bargaining position vis a vis a private firm with market power and leads to a lower price for the service. Outsourcing, Strategic Delegation, Incentives, Incomplete Contracting, Market Power, Representative Democracy.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working paper ; No. 7-2007

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Schultz, Christian
Bennedsen, Morten
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics
(wo)
Frederiksberg
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Schultz, Christian
  • Bennedsen, Morten
  • Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2008

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