Arbeitspapier
Arm's length provision of public services
We analyze the economic consequences of strategic delegation of the right to decide between public or private provision of governmental service and/or the authority to negotiate and renegotiate with the chosen service provider. Our model encompass both bureaucratic delegation from a government to a privatization agency and electoral delegation from voters to a government. We identify two powerfull effects of delegation when contracts are incomplete: The incentive effect increases the incentive part of service providers' remuneration and we show that strategic delegation may substitute formal incentive contracts. The bargaining effect improves the bargaining position vis a vis a private firm with market power and leads to a lower price for the service.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2161
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
Utilities: General
- Thema
-
outsourcing
strategic delegation
incentives
incomplete contracting
market power
representative democracy
Öffentliche Dienstleistung
Privatwirtschaft
Öffentlicher Sektor
Marktmacht
Demokratie
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bennedsen, Morten
Schultz, Christian
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bennedsen, Morten
- Schultz, Christian
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2007