Arbeitspapier

Arm's length provision of public services

We analyze the economic consequences of strategic delegation of the right to decide between public or private provision of governmental service and/or the authority to negotiate and renegotiate with the chosen service provider. Our model encompass both bureaucratic delegation from a government to a privatization agency and electoral delegation from voters to a government. We identify two powerfull effects of delegation when contracts are incomplete: The incentive effect increases the incentive part of service providers' remuneration and we show that strategic delegation may substitute formal incentive contracts. The bargaining effect improves the bargaining position vis a vis a private firm with market power and leads to a lower price for the service.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2161

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
Utilities: General
Thema
outsourcing
strategic delegation
incentives
incomplete contracting
market power
representative democracy
Öffentliche Dienstleistung
Privatwirtschaft
Öffentlicher Sektor
Marktmacht
Demokratie
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bennedsen, Morten
Schultz, Christian
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bennedsen, Morten
  • Schultz, Christian
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2007

Ähnliche Objekte (12)