Arbeitspapier

Dealer financial conditions and lender-of-last-resort facilities

We examine the financial conditions of dealers that participated in two of the Federal Reserve's lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) facilities - the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) - that provided liquidity against a range of assets during 2008-09. Dealers with lower equity returns and greater leverage prior to borrowing from the facilities were more likely to participate in the programs, borrow more, and - in the case of the TSLF - at higher bidding rates. Dealers with less liquid collateral on their balance sheets before the facilities were introduced also tended to borrow more. There also appear to be some interaction effects between financial performance and balance sheet liquidity in explaining dealer behavior. The results suggest that both financial performance and balance sheet liquidity play a role in LOLR utilization.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Staff Report ; No. 673

Classification
Wirtschaft
Financial Crises
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Central Banks and Their Policies
Auctions
Subject
lender of last resort
central banking
crises
illiquidity
insolvency
stigma

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Acharya, Viral V.
Fleming, Michael J.
Hrung, Warren B.
Sarkar, Asani
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(where)
New York, NY
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Acharya, Viral V.
  • Fleming, Michael J.
  • Hrung, Warren B.
  • Sarkar, Asani
  • Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Time of origin

  • 2014

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