Arbeitspapier

Match or Mismatch? Automatic Admissions and College Preferences of Low- and High-Income Students

We examine the role of information in the college matching behavior of low- and high-income students, exploiting a state automatic admissions policy that provides some students with perfect a priori certainty of college admissions. We find that admissions certainty encourages college-ready low-income students to seek more rigorous universities. Low-income students who are less college-ready are not influenced by admissions certainty and are sensitive to college entrance exams scores. Most students also prefer campuses with students of similar race, income, and high school class rank, but only highly-qualified low-income students choose institutions where they have fewer same-race and same-income peers.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 10150

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Analysis of Education
Higher Education; Research Institutions
Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
Thema
academic undermatching and overmatching
social matching
admissions policies
Texas Top 10% Plan
automatic admissions

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Lincove, Jane Arnold
Cortes, Kalena E.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Lincove, Jane Arnold
  • Cortes, Kalena E.
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2016

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