Match or Mismatch? Automatic Admissions and College Preferences of Low- and High-Income Students

Arbeitspapier

We examine the role of information in the college matching behavior of low- and high-income students, exploiting a state automatic admissions policy that provides some students with perfect a priori certainty of college admissions. We find that admissions certainty encourages college-ready low-income students to seek more rigorous universities. Low-income students who are less college-ready are not influenced by admissions certainty and are sensitive to college entrance exams scores. Most students also prefer campuses with students of similar race, income, and high school class rank, but only highly-qualified low-income students choose institutions where they have fewer same-race and same-income peers.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 10150

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Analysis of Education ; Higher Education; Research Institutions ; Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
• Subject: academic undermatching and overmatching ; social matching ; admissions policies ; Texas Top 10% Plan ; automatic admissions

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Lincove, Jane Arnold ; Cortes, Kalena E.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/147836
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET