Arbeitspapier

Workplace Incentives and Organizational Learning

This paper studies learning within organizations when incentives change. We use a simple principal-agent model to show how, in the presence of imperfect information over the shape of the production function, worker's effort choice changes over time as information is disclosed and processed. We also show that changes in workers compensation can trigger such learning process. We test this hypothesis using personnel records from a Peruvian egg production plant. Exploiting a sudden change in the compensation schedule, we find that workers learn from each other over the shape of the production function. This adjustment process is costly for the firm.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 13898

Classification
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Production Management
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Personnel Economics: Labor Management
Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
Subject
organizational learning
workplace incentives
inputs

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Amodio, Francesco
Martinez-Carrasco, Miguel A.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2020

Handle
Last update
2025-03-10T11:44:56+0100

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Amodio, Francesco
  • Martinez-Carrasco, Miguel A.
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2020

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