Arbeitspapier
Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information
We run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to en- force compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. We find a strong alert effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in compliance. Among different mailing conditions a legal threat that stresses a high detection risk has a significant and highly robust deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about others' behavior enhances compliance. However, the information condition has a positive effect in municipalities where evasion is believed to be common. Overall, the economic model of crime performs remarkably well in explaining our data.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: NRN Working Paper, NRN: The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State ; No. 0923
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Field Experiments
- Subject
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Field experiments
law enforcement
compliance
deterrence
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Fellner, Gerlinde
Sausgruber, Rupert
Traxler, Christian
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Johannes Kepler University Linz, NRN - The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State
- (where)
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Linz
- (when)
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2009
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Fellner, Gerlinde
- Sausgruber, Rupert
- Traxler, Christian
- Johannes Kepler University Linz, NRN - The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State
Time of origin
- 2009