Arbeitspapier

Testing enforcement strategies in the field: legal threat, moral appeal and social information

We run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to enforce compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. We find a strong alert effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in compliance. Among different mailing conditions a legal threat that stresses a high detection risk has a significant and highly robust deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about others' behavior enhances compliance. However, the information condition has a positive effect in municipalities where evasion is believed to be common. Overall, the economic model of crime performs remarkably well in explaining our data.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2009,31

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Field Experiments
Thema
Field experiments
law enforcement
compliance
deterrence
Rechtsdurchsetzung
Normbefolgung
Feldforschung
Rundfunkfinanzierung
Schuldrecht
Deutschland

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Fellner, Gerlinde
Sausgruber, Rupert
Traxler, Christian
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Fellner, Gerlinde
  • Sausgruber, Rupert
  • Traxler, Christian
  • Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Entstanden

  • 2009

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