Trust the Police? Self-Selection of Motivated Agents into the German Police Force

Arbeitspapier

We conduct experimental games with police applicants in Germany to investigate whether intrinsically motivated agents self-select into public service. Our focus is on trustworthiness and the willingness to enforce norms as key dimensions of intrinsic motivation in the police context. We find that police applicants are more trustworthy than non-applicants, i.e., they return higher shares as second-movers in a trust game. Furthermore, they invest more in rewards and punishment when they can enforce cooperation as a third party. Our results provide clear evidence for advantageous self-selection into the German police force, documenting an important mechanism by which the match between jobs and agents in public service can be improved.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 10410

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers ; Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; Public Sector Labor Markets
• Subject: self-selection ; intrinsic motivation ; public service ; trustworthiness ; norm enforcement

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Friebel, Guido ; Kosfeld, Michael ; Thielmann, Gerd
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/161033
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET