Tax consultants' incentives: A game-theoretic investigation into the behavior of tax consultants, taxpayers, and the tax authority in a setting of tax complexity

Arbeitspapier

We propose a game-theoretic investigation to capture the interplay between the behavior of tax consultants, taxpayers, and the tax authority in a setting of tax complexity. Our purpose is to provide answers to two research questions: Which aspects of the strategic interaction between the players induce tax consultants to provide inaccurate consulting services? How can we change the incentive structure in order to improve tax consulting quality? We find that tax consultants can be best motivated to work accurately by exogenously increasing the probability of tax underpayment and by ensuring that the tax authority corrects both tax underpayment and tax overpayment.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Passauer Diskussionspapiere - Betriebswirtschaftliche Reihe ; No. B-30-17

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Management ; Accounting and Auditing: Government Policy and Regulation ; Other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies ; Tax Law
• Subject: tax consultant ; tax law ; game theory

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Grottke, Markus ; Lorenz, Johannes
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Universität Passau, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
• (where): Passau
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/179479
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET