Incentives for environmental R&D

Arbeitspapier

Since governments can influence the demand for a new abatement technology through their environmental policy, they may be able to expropriate innovations in new abatement technology ex post. This suggests that incentives for environmental R&D may be lower than the incentives for market goods R&D. This in turn may be used as an argument for environmental R&D getting more public support than other R&D. In this paper we systematically compare the incentives for environmental R&D with the incentives for market goods R&D. We find that the relationship might be the opposite: When the innovator is able to commit to a licence fee before environmental policy is resolved, incentives are always higher for environmental R&D than for market goods R&D. When the government sets its policy before or simultaneously with the innovator's choice of licence fee, incentives for environmental R&D may be higher or lower than for market goods R&D.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Memorandum ; No. 2011,15

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies ; Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights: General ; Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation ; Environmental Economics: Government Policy
• Subject: R&D ; environmental R&D ; innovations ; endogenous technological change ; Industrielle Forschung ; Umwelttechnik ; Innovation ; Ökonomischer Anreiz ; Forschungs- und Technologiepolitik ; Umweltpolitik ; Endogener technischer Fortschritt ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Greaker, Mads ; Hoel, Michael
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Oslo, Department of Economics
• (where): Oslo
• (when): 2011

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47349
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET