Arbeitspapier
Incentives, Self-Selection, and Coordination of Motivated Agents for the Production of Social Goods
We study, theoretically and empirically, the effects of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents to produce a social good. Agents join teams where they allocate effort to either generate individual monetary rewards (selfish effort) or contribute to the production of a social good with positive effort complementarities (social effort). Agents differ in their motivation to exert social effort. Our model predicts that lowering incentives for selfish effort in one team increases social good production by selectively attracting and coordinating motivated agents. We test this prediction in a lab experiment allowing us to cleanly separate the selection effect from other effects of low incentives. Results show that social good production more than doubles in the low-incentive team, but only if self-selection is possible. Our analysis highlights the important role of incentives in the matching of motivated agents engaged in social good production.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9207
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General‡
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- Thema
-
incentives
intrinsic motivation
self-selection
public service
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bauer, Kevin
Kosfeld, Michael
von Siemens, Ferdinand
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2021
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bauer, Kevin
- Kosfeld, Michael
- von Siemens, Ferdinand
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2021
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