Social preferences on networks

Konferenzbeitrag

We develop a model of social preferences for network games and study its predictions in a local public goods game with multiple equilibria. The key feature is that players' social preferences are heterogeneous. This gives room for disagreement between players about the "right" payoff ordering. When preferences are compatible, however, players coordinate on a refined equilibrium set. How easily the requirements for preference compatibility are met crucially depends on a property of the network structure: neighborhood nestedness. This means that equilibrium selection succeeds in small, connected structures but also in centralized networks. All predictions are confirmed in an experiment.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2021: Climate Economics

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Network Formation and Analysis: Theory ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Public Goods
• Subject: social preferences ; network games ; equilibrium selection

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Westbrock, Bastian ; Rosenkranz, Stephanie ; Rezaei, Sarah ; Weitzel, Utz
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
• (where): Kiel, Hamburg
• (when): 2021

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/242447
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET