Konferenzbeitrag

Social preferences on networks

We develop a model of social preferences for network games and study its predictions in a local public goods game with multiple equilibria. The key feature is that players' social preferences are heterogeneous. This gives room for disagreement between players about the "right" payoff ordering. When preferences are compatible, however, players coordinate on a refined equilibrium set. How easily the requirements for preference compatibility are met crucially depends on a property of the network structure: neighborhood nestedness. This means that equilibrium selection succeeds in small, connected structures but also in centralized networks. All predictions are confirmed in an experiment.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2021: Climate Economics

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Public Goods
Thema
social preferences
network games
equilibrium selection

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Westbrock, Bastian
Rosenkranz, Stephanie
Rezaei, Sarah
Weitzel, Utz
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
(wo)
Kiel, Hamburg
(wann)
2021

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Konferenzbeitrag

Beteiligte

  • Westbrock, Bastian
  • Rosenkranz, Stephanie
  • Rezaei, Sarah
  • Weitzel, Utz
  • ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Entstanden

  • 2021

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