Arbeitspapier
A dynamic model of cross licensing
In sectors with cumulative and complementry technologies, some firms build patent portfolios in order to block their competitors' access to the technology and/or to negociate cross licensing agreements. We propose a dynamic model that captures this behaviour in an integrated duopoly where the firms invest successively in upstream patentable technologies and downstream marketable products. We study the impact of legal patent strength on competition and investment. We then consider two alternative settings. One where the firms cross license or pool their patents and another where the patent strength is restricetd. We verify whether and when such alternatives are socially efficient.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series ; No. WP04/24
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Ménière, Yann
Parlane, Sarah
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
University College Dublin, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Dublin
- (when)
-
2004
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Ménière, Yann
- Parlane, Sarah
- University College Dublin, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2004
Other Objects (12)
Cross Licensing of Complementary Technologies
Patent Licensing in Spatial Models
Optimal Cross-Licensing Arrangements: Collusion versus Entry Deterrence
How Licensing Resolves Hold-Up: Evidence from a Dynamic Panel Data Model with Unobserved Heterogeneity
Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation
A model of occupational licensing and statistical discrimination
A Dynamic Analysis of Licensing: The Boomerang Effect and Grant-Back Clauses
Private-collective software business models: Coordination and commercialization via licensing
Licensing with free entry
Dynamic factor models
Dynamic Effects of Licensing and Knowledge Transfer across Research Stages: Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry
Generalized Dynamic Panel Data Models with Random Effects for Cross-Section and Time
Cross Licensing of Complementary Technologies
Patent Licensing in Spatial Models
Optimal Cross-Licensing Arrangements: Collusion versus Entry Deterrence
How Licensing Resolves Hold-Up: Evidence from a Dynamic Panel Data Model with Unobserved Heterogeneity
Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation
A model of occupational licensing and statistical discrimination
A Dynamic Analysis of Licensing: The Boomerang Effect and Grant-Back Clauses
Private-collective software business models: Coordination and commercialization via licensing
Licensing with free entry
Dynamic factor models
Dynamic Effects of Licensing and Knowledge Transfer across Research Stages: Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry
Generalized Dynamic Panel Data Models with Random Effects for Cross-Section and Time
Cross Licensing of Complementary Technologies
Patent Licensing in Spatial Models
Optimal Cross-Licensing Arrangements: Collusion versus Entry Deterrence
How Licensing Resolves Hold-Up: Evidence from a Dynamic Panel Data Model with Unobserved Heterogeneity
Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation
A model of occupational licensing and statistical discrimination
A Dynamic Analysis of Licensing: The Boomerang Effect and Grant-Back Clauses
Private-collective software business models: Coordination and commercialization via licensing
Licensing with free entry
Dynamic factor models
Dynamic Effects of Licensing and Knowledge Transfer across Research Stages: Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry