Arbeitspapier
A Dynamic Analysis of Licensing: The Boomerang Effect and Grant-Back Clauses
This paper develops an incomplete contract model of the licensing relationship to analyze the dynamic effects of licensing on R&D competition in the innovation market and to examine the rationale for often observed grant-back clauses. Of particular concern are how the consideration of future competition distorts the licensing relationship and how the grant-back clause can mitigate this distortion. I also evaluate the validity of the casual antitrust argument that grant-back clauses may adversely affect competition because they reduce the licensee's incentive to engage in R&D and thereby limit rivalry in innovation markets.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 188
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Choi, Jay Pil
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
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Munich
- (wann)
-
1999
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Choi, Jay Pil
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 1999