A Dynamic Analysis of Licensing: The Boomerang Effect and Grant-Back Clauses

Arbeitspapier

This paper develops an incomplete contract model of the licensing relationship to analyze the dynamic effects of licensing on R&D competition in the innovation market and to examine the rationale for often observed grant-back clauses. Of particular concern are how the consideration of future competition distorts the licensing relationship and how the grant-back clause can mitigate this distortion. I also evaluate the validity of the casual antitrust argument that grant-back clauses may adversely affect competition because they reduce the licensee's incentive to engage in R&D and thereby limit rivalry in innovation markets.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 188

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Choi, Jay Pil
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 1999

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75533
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET