Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? : Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
ZEW Discussion Papers ; 13-035
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Mannheim
- (wer)
-
Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
- (wann)
-
2013
- Urheber
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-338135
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
25.03.2025, 13:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Heim, Sven
- Goetz, Georg
- Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
Entstanden
- 2013
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power
Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power
Supply Function Equilibria of Pay-as-Bid Auctions
All-pay auctions with reserve price and bid cap
Collusion in Auctions
Sealed Bid Auctions vs. Ascending Bid Auctions: An Experimental Study
Sealed Bid Auctions vs. Ascending Bid Auctions: An Experimental Study
Auctions as Collusion Devices
Comparing Supply Function Equilibria of Pay-as-Bid and Uniform-Price Auctions
How do external costs affect pay-as-bid renewable energy connection auctions?
Tacit collusion in repeated auctions
Tacit collusion in repeated auctions
Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power
Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power
Supply Function Equilibria of Pay-as-Bid Auctions
All-pay auctions with reserve price and bid cap
Collusion in Auctions
Sealed Bid Auctions vs. Ascending Bid Auctions: An Experimental Study
Sealed Bid Auctions vs. Ascending Bid Auctions: An Experimental Study
Auctions as Collusion Devices
Comparing Supply Function Equilibria of Pay-as-Bid and Uniform-Price Auctions
How do external costs affect pay-as-bid renewable energy connection auctions?
Tacit collusion in repeated auctions
Tacit collusion in repeated auctions
Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power
Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power
Supply Function Equilibria of Pay-as-Bid Auctions
All-pay auctions with reserve price and bid cap
Collusion in Auctions
Sealed Bid Auctions vs. Ascending Bid Auctions: An Experimental Study
Sealed Bid Auctions vs. Ascending Bid Auctions: An Experimental Study
Auctions as Collusion Devices
Comparing Supply Function Equilibria of Pay-as-Bid and Uniform-Price Auctions
How do external costs affect pay-as-bid renewable energy connection auctions?
Tacit collusion in repeated auctions