Monitoring and monetary incentives in addressing absenteeism: Evidence from a sequence of policy changes

Arbeitspapier

Exploiting three variations in sickness absence policy for civil servants in Italy, this paper assesses the importance of monitoring and monetary incentives in addressing absenteeism. Sickness absence is sensitive to monitoring intervals for random inspections, while moderate monetary incentives are relatively less effective. Results are not driven by attenuation bias, while a falsification test shows that, out of the 13 semesters analysed in this study, the only significant changes in relative public/private sector absence rates were observed in the three semesters in which stricter monitoring determined substantial increases in attendance.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ISER Working Paper Series ; No. 2011-10

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions ; Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: Public Policy ; Public Sector Labor Markets
• Subject: monetary incentives ; monitoring ; effort ; sickness absence ; Öffentlicher Dienst ; Krankheit ; Arbeitskräfte ; Fehlzeit ; Kontrolle ; Ökonomischer Anreiz ; Italien

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): D'Amuri, Francesco
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (where): Colchester
• (when): 2011

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/65980
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET