Bidding Rings: A Bargaining Approach

Arbeitspapier

We address the issue of bidder ring formation in single and multi-unit Vickrey auctions. We address this issue in a bargaining game set up under the assumption that valuation of bidders is commonly known only amongst themselves. In the single unit case, we show that the equilibrium coalition structure can only be an order preserving r-ring, that includes the winner and the top (r-1) losers. In the multiple units case, we specify sufficient conditions for formation of an interesting class of equilibrium coalition structures, which we call single winner ring with free riding, where exactly one winner colludes with all the losers and generates maximum possible bidders' surplus, and, depending on the protocol, the remaining winners free ride either by staying alone or by colluding in pairs.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2015:1

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Noncooperative Games ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Auctions ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
• Subject: Bidding rings ; Bargaining games ; Coalition formation ; Auctions

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Chatterjee, Kalyan ; Mitra, Manipushpak ; Mukherjee, Conan
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
• (where): Lund
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/260141
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET