Arbeitspapier

Social Norms and Optimal Incentives in Firms

This paper deals with the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We outline a simple model of team production and provide preliminary results on linear incentive schemes in the presence of a social norm that may cause multiple equilibria. The effect of the social norm on the optimal bonus rate is discussed, as well as the effectiveness of temporary changes in the bonus rate as a means to move a firm from a bad to a good equilibrium.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IUI Working Paper ; No. 565

Classification
Wirtschaft
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Subject
Social Norms
Incentives
Contracts
Leistungsanreiz
Leistungsentgelt
Theorie
Soziale Norm

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Huck, Steffen
Kübler, Dorothea
Weibull, Jörgen
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
(where)
Stockholm
(when)
2001

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Huck, Steffen
  • Kübler, Dorothea
  • Weibull, Jörgen
  • The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)

Time of origin

  • 2001

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